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NOTES
Understanding Mixed Motives Claims Under the Civil Rights
Act of 1991: An Analysis of Intentional Discrimination
Claims Based on Sex-Stereotyped Interview Questions

Heather K. Gerken
INTRODUCTION

During a job interview an employer asks a female applicant
whether the position would interfere with her child care arrangements,
her childbearing plans, or her relationship with her spouse. These
questions represent sex stereotypes, that is, a " 'set of attributes
ascribed to a group and imputed to its individual members because
they belong to that group.' " 1 The employer does not pose these questions to male applicants and ultimately selects a well-qualified man for
the position. The female applicant subsequently files a "mixed motives" discrimination claim, alleging that the employer based a hiring
decision upon both discriminatory and legitimate considerations.2
Has this employer violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643
1. Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of Power, 41
HAsr!NGS L.J. 471, 487 (1990) (quoting Madeline E. Heilman, Sex Bias in Work Settings: The
Lack ofFit Model, 5 REs. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 269, 271 (1983)). Sex stereotypes may

include assumptions that women are primarily responsible for child care, that a woman's career
is secondary to her husband's career, or that a woman necessarily will marry. The well·estab·
lished body of literature concerning the nature of sex stereotypes, see, e.g., infra notes 8-17,
should assist a factfinder in determining whether comments rest upon sex stereotypes. See also
Martha Chamallas, Listening to Dr. Fiske: The Easy Case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 15
VT. L. REv. 89, 90 (1990) (concluding that the evidence presented in the Supreme Court's most
recent decision on sex stereotyping was "located squarely within the mainstream" of psychology). But see Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1118 (D.D.C. 1985) (noting that
when evaluations do not, on their face, reflect sex stereotypes but merely represent negative comments about an employee, "it is impossible to label any particularly negative reaction as being
motivated by intentional sex stereotyping") modified, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). For a discussion of
the Supreme Court's review of Price Waterhouse, see infra notes 41-55 and accompanying text.
2. See Mark C. Weber, Beyond Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A New Approach to Mixed
Motive Discrimination, 68 N.C. L. REv. 495, 498 (1990); Max J. Schott, Note, Title VII MixedMotive Cases: The Eighth Circuit Adds a Second Track of Liability and Remedy, 36 DRAKE L.
REV. 155, 157 (1986-1987).
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1988)). Section 703(a) of Title VII provides that it is:
an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
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by posing questions based on sex stereotypes to the female applicant
during a job interview?4
In light of women's failure to achieve equality in the workplace, 5
sex stereotyping remains an important issue in employment law. Decades after Title VII outlawed employment discrimination on the basis
of sex, women still are concentrated in low-paying, low-status jobs. 6
In the late 1980s, the average female college graduate earned less than
the average white male with a high school diploma; she was also significantly less likely than a man to enjoy an advanced level of professional or financial achievement. 7
Sex stereotyping has played a significant role in limiting women's
career opportunities. 8 Studies reveal that sex stereotyping adversely
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a), 78 Stat. 241, 255.
4. Certain types of sex·stereotyped interview questions also may be unlawful under the
EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines, which prohibit "any pre-employment inquiry in connection with prospective employment which expresses directly or indirectly any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to sex .•. unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification." 29
C.F.R. § 1604.7 (1992). For example, questions about pregnancy are unlawful per se in the
absence of a bona fide occupational qualification. King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d
255, 258 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984). As noted by two commentators, however, "federal courts have been
somewhat less consistent [than the EEOC guidelines would require] ... in recognizing employer
stereotyping as per se gender discrimination under Title VII." Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S.
Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII: A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69
N.C. L. REv. 1, 59 (1990).
5. Deborah L. Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1207, 1208 (Despite legal
and cultural changes concerning sex equality, "wide disparities in the sexes' vocational status
have persisted."); see also Wendy Kaminer, Men Drive Trucks; Women Type, N.Y. TIMES, July
30, 1989, § 7 (Book Review), at 29 ("Twenty-five years after passage of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, economic equality for women ..• remains elusive.").
6. Rhode, supra note 5, at 1207, 1209; see also Peter T. Kilborn, Wage Gap Between Sexes ls
Cut in Test, but at a Price, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1990, at Al, Al2 (observing that women's
average pay is only 70% of men's average pay); Judy Mann, The Shatterproof Ceiling, WASH.
Posr, Aug. 17, 1990, at D3 (reporting that 95% of top management jobs in American corporations are held by white men); Barbara P. Noble, The Missing Issue in Campaign '92, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 25, 1992, at F23 (noting that women earn 70% of men's salaries).
7. Rhode, supra note 5, at 1209-10; see also Peter T. Kilborn, Labor Department Wants to
Take On Job Bias in the Executive Suite, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1990, at Al (noting that of the
directors and highest executives at 799 major companies, 3993 were men while only 19 were
women); Mann, supra note 6, at D3 (reporting that women college graduates who worked full
time in 1987 earned an average of $15,418 less than their male counterparts).
8. See Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1163, 1189
(1988) (arguing that sex stereotyping during hiring and promotion decisions "entrench gender
hierarchies"); Nadine Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of
Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C. L. REv. 345, 349 (1980) (concluding that sex stereotypes
"constitute a primary obstacle to equal employment opportunity").
While men may suffer the effects of sex stereotyping, women are the primary recipients of this
type of differential treatment. See, e.g., Rhode, supra, at 1187 (sex stereotypes "affect a variety of
..• attitudes and practices that translate into gender disadvantages"); cf. Radford, supra note 1,
at 534 (questioning "whether females suffer disproportionately" from sex stereotyping in employment evaluations and concluding that sex stereotyping should constitute "discrimination per
se"); I. Bennett Capers, Note, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VIL 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 1158, 1158
(1991) (noting that although men may file claims based on sex stereotyping under Title VII, the
courts have not yet addressed such a claim). Therefore, this Note focuses on situations encoun-
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affects the evaluation of a woman,s capabilities and performance. 9
Sex-stereotyped notions of achievement cause employers to define success in masculine termsio and to undervalue women,s accomplishments. I I Anything that heightens an employers awareness of a
worker,s femininity may adversely affect the employer,s evaluation of
her performance because it highlights the differences between her identity and the masculine qualities traditionally associated with success. I 2
tered by women. However, the analysis in this Note is equally applicable to discrimination
claims filed by men.
9. See, e.g., Madeline E. Heilman & Richard A. Guzzo, The Perceived Cause of Work Success
as a Mediator ofSex Discrimination in Organizations, 21 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. AND HUM.
PERFORMANCE 346, 346 (1978) (finding that views concerning the causes of the success of men
and women differ, resulting in "unequal treatment of equally successful men and women"); Bernice Lott, The Devaluation of Women's Competence, 41 J. Soc. ISSUES, Winter, at 43, 43 (1985)
(study reveals that men "will tend to judge a woman less favorably than a similarly or identically
credentialed or performing man"); Douglas Massengill & Nicholas Di Marco, Sex-Role Stereotypes and Requisite Management Characteristics: A Cu"ent Replication, 5 SEX ROLES 561
(1979) (citing numerous studies showing that sex stereotypes harm women in employment);
Rhode, supra note 5, at 1219-21; Rhode, supra note 8, at 1188 (citing numerous studies concern·
ing the effects of gender stereotyping upon women); Benson Rosen & Thomas H. Jerdee, Effects
ofApplicant's Sex and Difficulty ofJob on Evaluations of Candidates for Managerial Positions, 59
J. APPLIED PsYCHOL. 511, 511 (1974) (noting that "sex role stereotypes influence evaluations of
applicants and selection decisions"); Taub, supra note 8, at 349-61 (discussing studies which
demonstrate the detrimental effects of sex stereotyping).
Although many of the studies concerning the effects of sex stereotyping took place prior to
the 1980s, Radford, supra note 1, at 492 n.89, commentators have noted the continued relevance
of sex stereotyping in the workplace. See, e.g., id. at 492 n.89; Rhode, supra note 8, at 1187
("Traditional understandings of sexual roles continue to constrain women's occupational
choices."); Suzannah B. Wilson, Note, Eliminating Sex Discrimination in the Legal Profession:
The Key to Widespread Social Reform, 67 IND. L.J. 817, 822 (1992) ("Studies conducted during
the past two decades indicate that gender stereotypes in the workplace remain firmly entrenched
despite the advances made by women."). Moreover, recent studies reach similar conclusions to
those conducted during an earlier period. Compare Lott, supra, with Rosen & Jerdee, supra. See
also David J. Bergen & John E. Williams, Sex Stereotypes in the United States Revisited: 1972·
1988, 24 SEX ROLES 413 (1991) (noting that there "was no evidence that [masculine and feminine] stereotypes had become less differentiated" between 1972 and 1988).
10. Arnie Cann & William D. Siegfried, Gender Stereotypes and Dimensions of Ejfectfre
Leader Behavior, 23 SEX ROLES 413 (1990) ("Many studies have found that effective leadership
is perceived to require traits stereotyped as masculine."); Virginia E. Schein, The Relationship
Between Sex Role Stereotypes and Requisite Management Characteristics, 57 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 95 (1973) (noting that successful management is defined in male terms); see also Radford, supra note 1, at 492, 494, 497 (citing numerous studies concerning male success measures);
Rhode, supra note 5, at 1218 ("Continuing assumptions have been that ... women lack the
capacity or commitment for positions calling for physical strength, extended training, or managerial skills."); Wilson, supra note 9, at 823 ("Managerial positions are still viewed as being reserved for males because they are thought to require 'male' traits such as aggressiveness and
competitiveness."); cf. Mary G. Wiley & Arlene Eskilson, Coping in the Corporation: Sex Role
Constraints, 12 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1, 8 (arguing that "[t]he differential expectations of
men and women performing identical assertive roles result in less positive evaluations of women
than men").
Stereotypical male traits include being "aggressive, independent, unemotional, objective, not
easily influenced, dominant, calm, active, competitive, logical, worldly, skilled in business, direct,
adventurous, self-confident, ambitious." Radford, supra note 1, at 494.
11. See Lott, supra note 9, at 54 (concluding that "[t]he tendency to devalue a competent
woman ... appears to be more the rule than the exception"); Rhode, supra note 5, at 1219.
12. See Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 4, at 60-61; Taub, supra note 8, at 357-58.
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Sex-stereotyped interview questions focus an interviewer's attention
upon the limitations stereotypically associated with an applicant's gender - whether her children or her husband will take precedence over
her work, for example - instead of on the male characteristics that
define leadership and achievement. 13 The interview stage poses a particular risk that sex stereotyping will take place because the employer
has only limited knowledge of the individual. 14 Even women who exhibit the masculine characteristics traditionally associated with success suffer the effects of sex stereotyping because employers tend to
perceive women negatively when they do not conform to feminine stereotypes.15 Women are thus caught in a "Catch-22": to succeed they
must exhibit stereotypically masculine characteristics, yet doing so
will often reduce their chances of success. 16 Sex stereotyping, in tum,
adversely affects women's job performance by lowering women's aspirations and providing negative feedback for those who defy stereotypes.17 Stereotyping thus creates barriers to women's advancement in
the workplace, both by limiting a woman's achievements and by tainting an employer's evaluation of those accomplishments.
Although the federal courts have consistently recognized the discriminatory nature of sex stereotyping, 18 they are divided in determining whether sex stereotyping is actionable under Title VII when it
occurs during the interview stage of the hiring process. 19 The Sec13. Cf. Chamallas, supra note 1, at 98 (noting that sex stereotypes lead employers to scrutinize women on " 'feminine' " skills rather than " 'masculine' task or performance measures").
14. See Lott, supra note 9, at 55 (noting that "negative evaluations of competent women are
least likely in situations where persons are judging someone they know well, or with whom they
have worked or interacted"). But see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (sex
stereotyping tainted the evaluations of a woman's longtime colleagues).
15. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 1219; Wilson, supra note 9, at 823-25; cf. CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 75 (1987) (discussing
this dilemma).
16. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251; see also Rhode, supra note 8, at 1189.
17. See Radford, supra note 1, at 489, 500-01; Rhode, supra note 5, at 1221; Rhode, supra
note 8, at 1189-90, 1192 n.156.
18. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250-51; Barbano v. Madison County, 922 F.2d
139, 143 (2d Cir. 1990); King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1984);
Stukey v. United States Air Force, 790 F. Supp. 165, 170 (S.D. Ohio 1992). Even the courts that
found that sex-stereotyped interview questions do not provide adequate proof for a Title VII
claim characterized such inquiries as "discriminatory." Stukey, 790 F. Supp. at 170; cf. Bruno v.
City of Crown Point, 950 F.2d 355, 362 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that family oriented questions
must be asked in a "neutral, nondiscriminatory manner of all applicants" and that the defendant
failed to do so by posing such questions only to female candidates), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2998
(1992).
Because the courts concur that this type of differential treatment is discriminatory, this Note
will refer to sex stereotyping as "discriminatory." However, such references do not indicate that
this type of discrimination is always actionable under Title VII.
19. Stukey, 790 F. Supp. at 169 (observing the disagreement between the Second, Eighth, and
Seventh Circuits concerning this issue); see also Tracy L. Bach, Note, Gender Stereotyping in
Employment Discrimination: Finding A Balance of Evidence and Causation Under Title VII, 77
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ond20 and Eighth21 Circuits have found that sex-stereotyped interview
questions are actionable under Title VII because they assume such inquiries necessarily taint the hiring decision. Conversely, the Seventh
Circuit22 and the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio23
have held that sex-stereotyped questions standing alone do not support
a Title VII claim; these courts require a plaintiff to provide explicit
proof that the inquiries influenced the hiring decision. The Supreme
Court has held that a promotion decision tainted by sex stereotyping
may constitute employment discrimination, 24 but it has declined to delineate what forms of sex stereotyping, standing alone, constitute Title
VII violations. 2s
Recent amendments to Title VII raise additional questions about
intentional discrimination claims based on sex-stereotyped interview
questions. In enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 26 Congress established new guidelines for analyzing mixed motives cases and explicitly
rejected portions of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 27 the most recent
Supreme Court decision concerning sex stereotyping in the workplace.28 Therefore, a thorough understanding of Congressional intent
in amending Title VII is necessary to resolve issues concerning sexstereotyped interview questions.
This Note analyzes the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and relevant case
law to determine whether posing sex-stereotyped interview questions
is actionable conduct under Title VII. It questions whether proof of
discrimination during a phase in the hiring process, specifically during
the interview stage, supports a Title VII claim without other inL. REV. 1251, 1269-71 (examining split between Second and Seventh Circuits and proposing different resolution than this Note's proposal).
For the purpose of this Note, "hiring process" describes the events leading to the hiring
decision but does not refer to the decision itself. Phases of the hiring process may include the
application process, the screening process, the interview, the evaluation, and so forth. The term
"hiring decision" refers solely to the moment that the employer decides whether to employ the
applicant in question.
20. Barbano, 922 F.2d at 143.
21. King, 738 F.2d at 257-58.
22. Bruno, 950 F.2d at 362.
23. Stukey, 790 F. Supp. at 169-70.
24. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-51 (1989).
25. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251-52.
26. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to
2000e-16 (West Supp. 1992)).
27. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
28. H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 16-19 (1991) reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 702-12; id. pt. 1, at 45-48, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 583-87; H.R.
REP. No. 644, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 24-27 (1990); id. pt. 1, at 28-31; s. REP. No. 315,
lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 22-24 (1990); see also infra notes 100 & 111 (noting that the motivating
factor standard and the contributing factor standard discussed in the reports are identical). This
Note refers to the 1990 and 1991 House and Senate reports since the relevant provision and the
accompanying discussion in the reports were virtually identical for both versions of the Act.

MIN.

June 1993]

Note -

Sex-Stereotyped Interview Questions

1829

dependent evidence that the hiring decision was discriminatory. 29
Part I explains that the circuit courts have envisioned the impact of
discrimination during the hiring process differently and, as a result,
are divided in determining whether sex-stereotyped interview questions are actionable under Title VII. Part II examines the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to gauge Congress' intent in
establishing a framework to analyze mixed motives claims. It concludes that the language, structure, and legislative history of the Act
provide evidence of congressional intent to impose Title VII liability
for a discriminatory phase in the hiring process as long as that discrimination bears a minimal causal connection to the hiring decision.
Part II further concludes that sex-stereotyped interview questions are
sufficiently related to the hiring decision to satisfy this causal requirement. Part III proposes a two-prong test to facilitate consistent adjudication of claims based on sex-stereotyped interview questions that
promotes the goals of Title VII as amended by the Civil Rights Act of
1991. This Note concludes that if a plaintiff proves that an employer
posed sex-stereotyped questions during an interview, a court should
find that the employer violated Title VII unless the defendant introduces objective evidence that the interviewer posed similar questions to both men and women and that the sex stereotyping did not
affect the hiring decision.

I.

THE CASE LAW

The federal courts have split in determining whether sex-stereotyped interview questions are actionable under Title VII without other
independent evidence that the hiring decision was discriminatory.
Some courts recognize a link between sex-stereotyped interview questions and the hiring decision while other courts require explicit proof
of this causal connection. This Part analyzes the disagreement among
the federal courts over whether discrimination during a phase of the
hiring process, as evidenced by sex-stereotyped interview questions,
supports a Title VII claim. Section I.A defines mixed motives claims.
Section I.B examines Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 30 the Supreme
Court's most recent decision on sex stereotyping, and finds that it provides little guidance for determining whether sex-stereotyped interview questions are actionable under Title VII as currently amended.
Section I.C analyzes the division among the lower courts and argues
that the circuit split hinges upon whether, to establish a Title VII
29. Independent evidence requires a plaintiff to provide additional proof ~hat demonstrates
an explicit causal connection between the sex stereotyping which takes place during the interview
and the final hiring decision. While some courts have assumed this connection exists, other
courts have required a plaintiff to provide additional evidence of a causal link between sex stereotyping and the hiring decision. See infra section I.C.
30. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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claim, the court required independent proof that the hiring decision
was discriminatory. While some courts assume that discrimination
during the interview is sufficiently connected to the hiring decision to
justify imposing Title VII liability, other courts require the plaintiff to
produce evidence of this causal connection. This Part concludes that
the circuit split can only be resolved by thoroughly analyzing the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, which rejected key portions of Price Waterhouse
and created a new framework to analyze mixed motives discrimination
claims.
A. Mixed Motives Analysis: An Overview
Mixed motives claims allege that an employer has disparately
treated an applicant by basing an employment decision upon both illegitimate and legitimate considerations. 31 To prove disparate treatment under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an employer
intended to discriminate on the basis of a bias prohibited by the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.32 Although traditional disparate treatment analysis assumes that hiring decisions are based upon either wholly discriminatory or wholly legitimate considerations, 33 mixed motives analysis
reflects the reality that a hiring decision is seldom based solely upon
bias. 34 Courts have applied this insight to discrimination claims by
finding that an employer violates Title VII if discriminatory animus
influences the hiring decision to a certain degree. 35 The Supreme
31. Schott, supra note 2, at 157.
32. The Supreme Court has noted that disparate treatment is "the most easily understood
type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is
critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). The
Court distinguished disparate treatment from disparate impact claims, which "involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall
more harshly on one group than another . . . • Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is
not required under a disparate-impact theory." International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336
n.15 (citations omitted). This Note involves disparate treatment claims because the sex-stereotyped questions it considers are asked only of women. Arguably, one could bring a disparate
impact claim against an employer who asked sex-stereotyped questions to both men and women
if the sex-stereotyping had a greater effect upon female candidates. See infra note 125 (discussing
disparate impact analysis within the context of this Note's two-prong test for analyzing disparate
treatment questions).
For a general description of disparate treatment litigation, see Mark S. Brodin, The Standard
of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 CoLUM. L.
REV. 292, 301-11 (1982), and Sam Stonefield, Non-Determinative Discrimination, Mixed Motil'es,
and the Inner Boundary of Discrimination Law, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 85, 105-23 (1986). For a
general history of developments in equal employment law, see Eleanor H. Norton, Equal Employment Law: Crisis in Interpretation-Survival Against the Odds, 62 TUL. L. REV. 681 (1988).
33. See Radford, supra note l, at 514.
34. Id.
35. The courts are divided, however, in determining to what extent discriminatory animus
must influence the hiring decision to constitute a Title VII violation. See infra note 101 and
accompanying text.
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Court has endorsed this method of analyzing some Title VII claims. 36
The Court, however, has not reviewed an intentional discrimination
claim based solely upon sex-stereotyped interview questions, 37 nor
have the federal courts reached a consensus in applying the tools of
mixed motives analysis to such claims. 38
B. - Mixed Motives Analysis in Recent Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court has provided little guidance concerning
whether sex-stereotyped interview questions, standing alone, may establish a Title VII violation. In its only treatment of a Title VII claim
based on such questions, the Court in Anderson v. City of Bessemer 39
held that such questions, when combined with separate proof of highly
discriminatory comments and the plaintiff's superior qualifications,
provided evidence to support a Title VII claim. Because sex-stereotyped interview questions constituted only a small part of the plaintiff's case, 40 the Court's reasoning merely confirms that such inquiries
provide evidence of discriminatory intent. The Anderson Court did
not indicate whether sex-stereotyped interview questions alone provide
sufficient support for a Title VII claim, nor did it clearly distinguish
between discrimination during the interview stage of the hiring process
and bias in the hiring decision.
At first glance, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 41 the Court's most
recent analysis of sex stereotyping, indicates that courts should only
consider discrimination in the ultimate employment decision when adjudicating mixed motives claims. The plaintiff in Price Waterhouse alleged that Price Waterhouse had denied her partnership on the basis of
gender; she established that gender had played a role in the employment decision by demonstrating that sex stereotyping tainted the evaluations used to determine partnership.42 Price Waterhouse resolved a
split within the circuits concerning the proper allocation of the burdens of proof when a plaintiff presents evidence that illegitimate factors influenced the employment decision. 43 The plurality asserted that
36. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 232, 241-42.
37. The Supreme Court did, however, consider a case in which sex-stereotyped interview
questions represented part of a Title VII claim. See infra notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text
(discussing Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564 (1985)).
38. In addition, the circuit courts have not consistently analyzed mixed motives claims based
on other forms of discrimination. Radford, supra note 1, at 518, 523; see also infra note 101 and
accompanying text (discussing the standards used by the federal courts to analyze mixed motives
questions).
39. 470 U.S. 564, 580 (1985).
40. See 470 U.S. at 569, 579-80.
41. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
42. 490 U.S. at 255-58.
43. 490 U.S. at 238 n.2 (noting the division within the circuits). Some circuit courts required
the plaintiff to prove that, "but for" her gender, the defendant would have hired the plaintiff in
order to establish a Title VII violation. See, e.g., McQuillen v. Wisconsin Educ. Assn. Council,
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"[r]emarks at work that are based on sex stereotypes do not inevitably
prove that gender played a part in a particular employment decision. "44 The plurality held, therefore, that sex stereotyping during a
partnership evaluation process constituted a Title VII violation only if
the sex-stereotyping played a "motivating part" in the "employment
decision. " 45 This language indicates that sex-stereotyped interview
questions alone cannot provide sufficient support for a Title VII claim.
Closer analysis, however, reveals that Price Waterhouse may support the position that sex stereotyping during an interview is actionable under Title VII. 46 Despite the plurality's assertion that the
plaintiff must demonstrate that discrimination was a motivating factor
for the employer's actions "at the moment of the decision, " 47 the plurality assumed a causal connection between a discriminatory evalua830 F.2d 659, 664-65 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 914 (1988); Peters v. City of Shreveport, 818 F.2d 1148, 1151 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 930 (1988); Bellissimo v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 1035 (1986);
Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365-66 (4th Cir. 1985). Other courts
held that, once the plaintiff established that discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor
in the employment decision, the defendant may avoid Title VII liability by proving that the
employer would have made the same decision even in a nondiscriminatory hiring process. Berl v.
County of Westchester, 849 F.2d 712, 714-15 (2d Cir. 1988); Terbovitz v. Fiscal Court, 825 F.2d
111, 115 (6th Cir. 1987); Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 936-37 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 976 (1993); Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1983) cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 1204 (1984). Finally, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits imposed liability upon the
defendant whenever the plaintiff proved that discrimination had played a role in the hiring decision, but they allowed the defendant to limit the plaintiff's remedy by proving that the employer
would not have hired the plaintiff even in a nondiscriminatory hiring process. Bibbs v. Block,
778 F.2d 1318, 1320-24 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane); Fadhl v. City & County of San Francisco, 741
F.2d 1163, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 1984).
The Court adopted the analytical framework of the First, Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Cir·
cuits. The plurality held:
when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender played a motivating part in an
employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not
taken the plaintiff's gender into account.
490 U.S. at 258 (plurality opinion).
44. 490 U.S. at 251 (plurality opinion). Although the Price Waterhouse decision concerned a
denial of a promotion, the Court used general language to describe the defendant's action as an
"employment decision." See, e.g., 490 U.S. at 250-52 (plurality opinion). The case concerned
evaluations during a promotion decision, but the Court discussed sex stereotyping in sufficiently
general terms to apply Price Waterhouse to claims based on sex-stereotyped interview questions.
45. 490 U.S. at 258 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). In their concurring opinions, Jus·
tices White and O'Connor narrowed the plurality holding by creating a heightened standard for
the plaintiff to prove a prima facie case under Title VII. Under their concurring opinions, the
Price Waterhouse standard requires that the discrimination play a "substantial" role in the em·
ployment decision. 490 U.S. at 259 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); 490 U.S. at 278
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Two of the House Reports accompanying the Act
interpreted the Court's holding to mean "that evidence of sex stereotyping is sufficient to prove
gender discrimination." H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 28, pt. 1, at 45 n.39 reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 583 n.39; H.R. REP. No. 644, supra note 28, pt. 1, at 29 n.17.
46. Cf Radford, supra note l, at 525 (observing that the lack of clarity in the decision makes
it "difficult to articulate the effect of the [Price Waterhouse] opinions").
47. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (emphasis added).
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tion process and the employment decision on the facts of the case.48
Because the Court assumed that sex-stereotyped evaluations had influenced the employment decision, 49 Price Waterhouse suggests that discrimination during the hiring process may be sufficiently connected to
an adverse employment decision to justify imposing Title VII liability
without further proof that the final hiring decision was discriminatory.
This interpretation is further strengthened by the fact that the Court
arguably discussed the motivating factor standard only to distinguish
"stray remarks" in the workplace50 from sex stereotyping during the
partnership evaluation process. The plurality found that, unlike sexstereotyped evaluations, random sexist comments from people outside
the evaluation process are unlikely to affect the employment decision
and therefore cannot establish a Title VII violation. 51 Consequently,
under the Court's analysis, sex stereotyping during the hiring process
may be sufficiently connected to the hiring decision to support a Title
VII claim.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion further undercuts the view
that under Price Waterhouse a plaintiff must demonstrate an explicit
causal connection between a discriminatory interview and the hiring
decision. 52 O'Connor found that the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse
"had taken her proof as far as it could go. She had proved [that] discriminatory input into the decisional process ... had been a substan48. The plurality rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiff had not produced evidence that sex stereotyping played a role in the employment decision. 490 U.S. at 256-57. Because sex stereotyping tainted the evaluations upon which the defendant relied in making the
decision at issue, the Court found that it was "a plausible - and, one might say, inevitable conclusion to draw from this set of circumstances that the [defendant] in making its decision did
in fact take into account .•. comments that were motivated by stereotypical notions." 490 U.S.
at 256; see also Radford, supra note 1, at 51~ (noting that the plurality opinion assumed a causal
connection between the discrimination and the hiring decision). It is unclear, however, whether
the Supreme Court would assume this type of causal connection if the connection between the
hiring decision and the discriminatory hiring process had been more attenuated. Cf 490 U.S. at
251-52.
49. 490 U.S. at 256-57 (plurality opinion).
50. 490 U.S. at 251 (plurality opinion).
51. Although the plurality did not elaborate upon its definition of "stray remarks" in the
workplace, 490 U.S. at 251, Justice O'Connor noted that both "stray remarks" and "statements
by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process" do
not provide adequate evidence to establish a Title VII violation. 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment). But see Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse:
Proving Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1107, 1150-51 (1991) (arguing
that the statements of subordinates and coworkers may be "critical" for Title VII claims).
52. 490 U.S. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor would
require the plaintiff to demonstrate that discrimination played a "substantial" role in the employment decision, see supra note 45, but she supported the plurality's requirement that the defendant
prove that the discrimination did not influence the employment decision once the plaintiff had
made such a showing. Although O'Connor disagreed with the broad scope of the plurality's
analysis of causation under Title VII, she recognized that requiring the plaintiff in this case to
demonstrate an explicit causal connection between the discrimination and the employment decision would be "tantamount to declaring Title VII inapplicable to such decisions." 490 U.S. at
273.

1834

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 91:1824

tial factor in the decision." 53 Although O'Connor did not adopt the
"motivating factor" test of the plurality opinion, 54 she argued against
forcing the plaintiff to demonstrate an explicit causal connection between the sex stereotyping and the employment decision, noting that
many lower courts have determined that "placing the risk of nonpersuasion on the defendant in a situation where uncertainty as to causation has been created by its consideration of an illegitimate criterion
makes sense as a rule of evidence and furthers the substantive command of Title VII."55
Ultimately, Price Waterhouse provides conflicting guidelines for
determining whether sex-stereotyped interview questions are actionable under Title VII. The opinion's explicit language requires courts to
examine only the employment decision to determine whether a Title
VII violation has occurred, but the Court's analysis suggests that discrimination during the evaluation stage of a hiring or promotion process may in itself be actionable under Title VII whenever it is closely
intertwined with the employment decision.
C.

The Circuit Split

The federal courts agree that a discriminatory hiring decision violates Title VII. They have not reached a consensus, however, in determining whether sex-stereotyped interview questions are actionable
under Title VII absent independent proof that this discrimination influenced the hiring decision. In Bruno v. City of Crown Point, 56 the
Seventh Circuit reversed a jury finding that an employer had discriminated when he asked the plaintiff about child care, her future child
bearing plans, and her husband's opinion of her application for a
paramedic position. While acknowledging that these questions were
based on sex stereotypes, 57 the Seventh Circuit relied upon Price
Waterhouse in holding that "[t]he fact that family-oriented questions
are asked only of female applicants ... is not in itself sufficient evidence to support a finding of intentional sex discrimination . . . . [because] [t]he plaintiff must prove that the employer based his decision
on the sex stereotypes implicit in such questions ...." 5 8
53. 490 U.S. at 272 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
54. See supra note 45.
55. 490 U.S. at 273 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
56. Bruno v. City of Crown Point, Ind., 950 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
2998 (1992).
57. 950 F.2d at 362.
58. 950 F.2d at 365. The Bruno court reached its decision after examining evidence that the
employer had been satisfied with the plaintiff's responses to the sex·stereotyped questions. 950
F.2d at 362. Judge Easterbrook dissented, finding this reasoning unpersuasive because "[t]hese
paternalistic questions, asked only of women, show that [the employer] thought about men and
women differently and allowed the jury to infer that he believes a woman's place is in the home."
950 F.2d at 365; see also infra notes 115-20 and accompanying text (arguing that women whose
answers satisfy an employer also may suffer from the effects of sex-stereotyped questions).
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
adopted this reasoning in Stukey v. United States Air Force. 59 In
Stukey, the employer asked the plaintiff about her marital status, her
ability to work and travel with men, and her child care arrangements
but did not pose these questions to male applicants. After examining
appellate decisions on both sides of the question, the Stukey court concluded that the plaintiff had not proven that the final hiring decision
was tainted by bias, even though the interview was discriminatory, and
therefore denied motions for summary judgment.60
Both the Bruno and Stukey courts seemed to envision the events
leading to the employer's refusal to hire the plaintiff as two discrete,
unrelated phases - the interview phase and the hiring decision. Their
analyses reflect the belief that only the employment decision falls
under the protection of Title VII. After reviewing the plaintiff's evidence in Bruno, the Seventh Circuit found that proof of sex stereotyping during the interview did not provide adequate ~vidence of
employment discrimination because the plaintiff had not proven that
"gender played a part in a particular employment decision. " 61 Similarly, in adopting the Bruno holding, the district court held that,
although the hiring "subcommittee subjected [the plaintift] to a discriminatory interview[,] ... a question of fact exists as to whether the
Defendants made a discriminatory employment decision. " 62
The Second and Eighth Circuits have adopted a different approach
to analyze mixed motives claims based on sex stereotyping during the
interview phase of the hiring process. These courts hold that a demonstration that an employer posed sex-stereotyped questions during an
interview is sufficient to prove a Title VII claim; they infer that a discriminatory hiring process will result in a discriminatory hiring decision. In King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 63 the Eighth Circuit found
that the plaintiff met her burden of persuasion in a Title VII claim by
demonstrating that the interviewer asked her questions about pregnancy, childbearing, and child care and did not pose similar questions
59. 790 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
60. 790 F. Supp. at 168-170. In the final decision, the court used the model outlined by the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to determine
whether the employer had violated Title VII. Stukey, 190 F. Supp. at 168-70. While emphasizing that sex-stereotyped interview questions standing alone did not constitute violations of Title
VII, the court in later proceedings found these inquiries indirectly supported the plaintiff's claim
under the McDonnell Douglas framework by helping her to prove that the employer's justification for its hiring decision was a pretext. Stukey v. United States Air Force, 809 F. Supp. 536,
542-44 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
61. Bruno, 950 F.2d at 362 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)
(plurality opinion)) (emphasis added). The court reached this holding in light of evidence that
the defendant had not been concerned about plaintiff's responses to these questions. But see
infra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
62. Stukey, 190 F. Supp. at 170.
63. 738 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1984).
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to other applicants. 64 The King court explicitly noted that its holding
turned upon the plaintiff's claim that she was treated differently during the hiring process, 65 despite the lack of additional evidence that
the discrimination had tainted the hiring decision. Sex-stereotyped interview questions "raised the inference that this difference in treatment
at the interview stage of the hiring process was at least in part the product of unlawful discrimination."66 The court concluded that "it is
clear that an employer cannot have two interview policies for job applicants ... one for men and one for women. "67
The Second Circuit has adopted a similar approach to adjudicating
claims based on sex-stereotyped interview questions. In Barbano v.
Madison County, 68 the court held that asking a woman about her family plans and her husband's opinion of her job application during an
interview provided sufficient proof of a Title VII violation. 69 In contrast to the Stukey and Bruno courts, the Second Circuit found that
sex stereotyping during the interview had tainted the hiring decision
without further proof of its connection to the final decision. After
finding that the "interview itself was discriminatory," 70 the court
noted that when a judge "could find that the evaluation of [a candidate] was biased by gender discrimination, the judge could also find
that the [interviewers'] recommendation to hire [a man] ... was necessarily tainted by [the] discrimination."71
The division within the lower federal courts in adjudicating claims
based on sex-stereotyped interview questions hinges upon the courts'
judgments of whether discrimination during the interview phase of the
hiring process necessarily results in a tainted employment decision.
64. 738 F.2d at 258-59. The court then held that, once the plaintiff had proved a Title VII
violation, the employer could limit her remedy by proving that the plaintiff would not have been
hired even if the hiring process had been nondiscriminatory. 738 F.2d at 257-59.
65. 738 F.2d at 257.
66. 738 F.2d at 258 (emphasis added).
67. 738 F.2d at 258-59. The Eighth Circuit affirmed its adoption of the King analysis and
shed additional light upon its reasoning in an en bane decision one year later. Bibbs v. Block, 778
F.2d 1318, 1323 (8th Cir. 1985). In Bibbs, the Eighth Circuit noted that its analysis of mixed
motives questions required a minimal causal connection to exist between the discrimination
which occurred during a stage in the hiring process and the final hiring decision in order to
impose Title VII liability. Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1325, 1328 (Lay, C.J., joined by Heany & McMillan, JJ., concurring). Although the Bibbs decision does not address a claim based on sex-stereotyped interview questions, it more clearly explains the Eighth Circuit's two-tiered framework for
analyzing such claims, which splits the questions of liability and remedy. See Schott, supra note
2, at 179 (arguing that the Bibbs decision represents an extension of the King analysis).
68. 922 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1990).
69. 922 F.2d at 141, 145.
70. 922 F.2d at 143.
71. 922 F.2d at 143. In Barbano, the Second Circuit focused not only on the existence of
discrimination during the interview phase, but on the connection between that discrimination
and the employer's hiring decision. The King court did not explicitly make this connection.
However, the Eighth Circuit's affirmation of King, see supra note 67, underlines the similarities
between the approaches of the two circuits.
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Courts that recognize this link, like the Second and Eighth Circuits,
find a Title VII violation upon proof that an employer posed sex-stereotyped questions during an interview. Other courts, such as the Seventh Circuit, will not find a violation on the same facts unless the
plaintiff presents independent evidence that the hiring decision was
discriminatory. These conflicting views on the discriminatory impact
of sex-stereotyped interview questions lead to inconsistent results for
similar Title VII claims.
II.

SECTION

107 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991

Proper resolution of the circuit split concerning claims based on
sex-stereotyped interview questions requires a thorough understanding
of the 1991 amendments to Title Vll. 72 The Civil Rights Act of 1991
established a new framework for mixed motives analysis and explicitly
rejected the Supreme Court's interpretation of mixed motives Title VII
claims under Price Waterhouse. 73 In creating the new mixed motives
framework, Congress was aware that the Civil Rights Act of 1991
would affect future courts' analyses of claims based on discrimination
during the hiring process. 74 Indeed, Congress explicitly approved of
King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. and four related cases concerning
discrimination during the hiring process to explain the Act's new analytical framework. 75 Thus, Congress' intent in passing section 107 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides important guidance in determin72. The Stukey and Bruno decisions were decided after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, which was intended to take "effect upon enactment." Pus. L. No. 102-166, § 402(a),
105 Stat. 1071, 1099 (1991). The legislative history of the Act did not clearly indicate whether
the legislation should be applied retroactively, however. Michele A. Estrin, Note, Retroactive
Application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Pending Cases, 90 MICH. L. REv. 2035, 2050-55
(1992). The courts seemed to ignore the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in reaching their decisions. It
appears that the courts have not yet applied the provisions of the Act to claims based on sexstereotyped interview questions.
73. H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 28, pt. 2, at 16-19, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 70212; id. pt. I, at 47-48, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 585-87; H.R. REP. No. 644, supra note
28, pt. 2, at 10; id. pt. 1, at 64-65; S. REP. No. 315, supra note 28, at 6-7. The new framework
imposes liability upon a defendant whenever a plaintiff demonstrates that discrimination was a
"motivating factor" for an employment practice. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071,
1075-76 (1991). It allows the defendant to limit the plaintiff's remedies by proving that it would
have made the same decision even if discrimination had not tainted the hiring process. See infra
notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
74. See infra section II.B. for an analysis of the connection between discrimination during
the hiring process and the language and structure of the Act.
75. See H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 28, pt. 2, at 18 n.31, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
711 n.31; id. pt. 1, at 46 n.41, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 584 n.41; H.R. REP. No. 644,
supra note 28, pt. 1, at 29 n.19; S. REP. No. 315, supra note 28, at 23 n.13 (citing Bibbs v. Block,
778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (discrimination during the evaluation process); King, 738
F.2d 255 (discriminatory interview); Ostroff v. Employment Exch. Inc., 683 F.2d 302 (9th Cir.
1982) (discrimination during the application process); Nanty v. Barrows Co., 660 F.2d 1327 (9th
Cir. 1981) (discrimination during the screening process); Roberts v. Fri, 29 Fair Employment
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1445 (D.D.C. 1980) (discrimination during the application and evaluation
process)); see also infra section II.B.
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ing (1) whether intentional discrimination during a phase in the hiring
process is actionable under Title VII without independent evidence
that the hiring decision was discriminatory and, if so, (2) whether posing sex-stereotyped questions during the interview stage constitutes intentional discrimination.
This Part analyzes the language and legislative history of section
107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to determine the answer to these
questions. Section II.A argues that Congress intended to hold an employer liable for discrimination under section 107 whenever a nexus
exists between the discrimination and the final hiring decision, even if
the employer would not have hired the plaintiff in a nondiscriminatory
hiring process. Section Il.B examines the mechanics, language, and
legislative history of section 107 to gauge the intended scope of the
provision. Section Il.B argues that discrimination during a phase of
the hiring process may constitute intentional discrimination under the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 whenever the discrimination bears a minimal
causal connection to the hiring decision. Section II.C describes the
legislators' views of the Act's framework for analyzing mixed motives
claims and gleans a general definition of that causal requirement: the
"motivating factor" standard. It then uses the motivating factor test
to examine claims based on sex-stereotyped interview questions and to
determine whether discrimination during a job interview is sufficiently
connected to the hiring decision to establish a disparate treatment
claim under section 107. This Part concludes that sex-stereotyped interview questions meet the causal requirements of the motivating factor standard and therefore support a Title VII claim.

A.

The Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991

Congress adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to overturn a series
of Supreme Court decisions that had limited civil rights protections in
the employment setting.76 Legislators intended the Act to strengthen
existing protections and remedies available under federal civil rights
laws. 77 Congress created section 107 to overturn Price Waterhouse in
order to prevent it from "undermin[ing] Title VIl's twin objectives of
deterring employers from discriminatory conduct and redressing the
injuries suffered by victims of discrimination." 78
Section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 specifically rejects Price
Waterhouse's holding that, once a plaintiff makes an initial showing of
76. H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 28, pt. 2, at 1, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 694; Id.
pt. 1, at 15, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 522; H.R. REP. No. 644, supra note 28, pt. 1, at 8;
S. REP. No. 315, supra note 28, at 6.
77. H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 28, pt. 2, at 1, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 694; Id.
pt. 1, at 15, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 522; H.R. REP. No. 644, supra note 28, pt. 1, at 8;
S. REP. No. 315, supra note 28, at 6.
78. H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 28, pt. 2, at 17, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 710.
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intentional discrimination, a defendant may avoid liability for a Title
VII violation by demonstrating that the plaintiff would not have been
promoted or hired even through a nondiscriminatory evaluation process. 79 Instead, the Act requires that, once a plaintiff demonstrates
that discriminatory animus was a "motivating factor" for an employment practice, a court must find that the defendant violated Title
VII. 80 According to the reports accompanying the Act, the section
107 test requires there to be a "nexus . . . between the conduct or
statements and the employment decision at issue." 81 Based on this
finding, a court may award the plaintiff declaratory relief, injunctive
relief, attorney's fees, and costs directly associated with pursuit of the
claim. 82 However, the defendant still may limit the plaintiff's other
Title VII remedies, including back pay awards and reinstatement, by
proving that the defendant would not have hired or promoted the
plaintiff even if the evaluation process had been nondiscriminatory. 83
By splitting analysis of liability and calculation of remedy for mixed
motives claims, 84 Congress intended to deter discrimination without
awarding plaintiffs an undeserved windfall. 85
79. H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 28, pt. 2, at 18-19, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 71112; id. pt. 1, at 48-49, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 586-87; H.R. REP. No. 644, supra note
28, pt. 2, at 26-27; id. pt. 1, at 64-65; S. REP. No. 315, supra note 28, at 48-49.
80. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (1991).
81. See, e.g., H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 856, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1990). The Report
notes that "any discrimination that is actually shown to play a role in a contested employment
decision may be the subject of liability. Conduct or statements are relevant under this test only if
the plaintiff shows a nexus between the conduct or statements and the employment decision at
issue." Id. The language of the reports accompanying the Act did not precisely mirror the
language of the statute. The 1991 House Report distinguishes between "conduct or statements"
and the "employment decision"; the statute notes the difference between the "employment practice" and the employer's "action." See infra notes 82-83 & section 11.B (discussing the language
of the statute).
82. Section 107 states: "Except as otherwise provided in this title, an unlawful employment
practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice." Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991).
83. Section 107 provides:
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 703(m) and a respondent
demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the
impermissible factor, the court (i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and
attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a
claim under section 703(m); and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement,
hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A).
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (1991).
84. Mark Brodin first proposed this method for analyzing mixed motives claims in 1982.
Brodin, supra note 32. The Eighth Circuit adopted this type of analysis in Bibbs v. Block, 778
F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1985). See supra note 67.
85. H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 28, pt. 2, at 18-19 reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 71112; id., pt. 1, at 48-49 reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 586-87; H.R. REP. No. 644, supra note
28, pt. 2, at 26-27; id. pt. 1, at 65; S. REP. No. 315, supra note 28, at 48-49.

1840

Michigan Law Review

B.

[Vol. 91:1824

The Language and Legislative History of Section 107

The language, structure, and legislative history of section 107 suggest that Congress intended discrimination during a phase in the hiring process to constitute intentional discrimination whenever that
discrimination bears a minimal causal connection to an adverse hiring
decision. 86 Section 107 has a two-tiered framework which splits analysis of liability from determination of remedy. The first part of section
107 states that a Title VII violation should be found when discriminatory animus was "a motivating factor for any employment practice. " 87
According to the reports accompanying the Act, the section 107 test
requires a "nexus between the conduct or statements and the employment decision at issue." 88 Under the second tier of the section 107
framework, a defendant may limit plaintiff's remedy by demonstrating
that the defendant "would have taken the same action in the absence
of the impermissible motivating factor." 89 By distinguishing between
the Title VII violation that occurs when discrimination taints any employment "practice" and the remedial implications that arise from a
specific employment "action," the language of the statute reveals that
discrimination during a phase in the hiring process, not just a biased
hiring decision, may constitute a Title VII violation when it meets the
requirements of the motivating factor standard. 90 The two-tiered
structure of section 107 also supports the inference that Congress intended that discrimination during a phase in the hiring process may
violate Title VII even without independent evidence that the hiring
decision was discriminatory. If the Title VII violation depended solely
upon the hiring decision, the inquiries could occur simultaneously,
and there would have been no need to adopt the bifurcated structure
of section 107.91
An examination of the legislative history of the Act reinforces the
conclusion that discrimination during one step of the hiring process
may establish a Title VII violation when it bears some connection to
the hiring decision. 92 In discussing the section 107 framework, reports
86. See infra section 11.C. (defining the motivating factor test).
87. PUB. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991) (emphasis added).
88. See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 856, supra note 81, at 18-19.
89. PUB. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991) (emphasis added).
90. See infra section 11.C.
91. One might argue Congress intended to find liability for a small amount of discrimination
during the hiring decision and to require a remedy only when the discrimination actually altered
the hiring decision, but the cases explicitly cited in the House and Senate reports significantly
undercut this argument. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
92. But see 47 CoNG. Q. ALMANAC 257 (1991) (statement of Senator Danforth) ("Any judge
who tries to make legislative history out of the free-for-all that takes place on the floor of the
Senate is on very dangerous grounds."). Nevertheless, much of the controversy concerning the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 concerned the standards for establishing disparate impact under Title
VII; it is relatively easier to derive a consistent understanding of section 107 from the legislative
history of the Act than it is to make sense of the statements regarding disparate impact.

June 1993]

Note - Sex-Stereotyped Interview Questions

1841

accompanying the Act explicitly approved of five cases, including King
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 93 which focused on discrimination during a phase in the hiring process rather than on bias within the hiring
decision. 94 Congress endorsed the analytical framework used by
courts that explicitly impose liability upon a defendant when the plaintiff demonstrates that discrimination tainted the hiring ·process without requiring further evidence that the hiring decision was
discriminatory. 95 By relying upon cases that focused upon discrimination during a phase in the hiring process as the sole basis for a Title
VII claim, Congress reinforced the inferences which may be drawn
from the language and two-tiered framework of the statute.

C.

The Motivating Factor Test

As illustrated, discrimination during a phase in the hiring process
constitutes intentional discrimination when it bears a causal connection to the hiring decision. 96 Therefore, proper adjudication of claims
based on sex-stereotyped interview questions requires a thorough understanding of the motivating factor standard, which evaluates that
causal connection. 97 This section analyzes claims based on sex-stereotyped interview questions under the section 107 framework. Subsection II.C.1 analyzes the legislative history of section 107 and
93. 738 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1984).
94. See supra note 75. Several of these courts, unlike the Civil Rights Act of 1991, required a
plaintiff to present "direct evidence" of discrimination to trigger mixed motives analysis. Charles
A. Edwards, Direct Evidence of Discriminatory Intent and the Burden of Proof: An Analysis and
Critique, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REv. l, 13-17 (1986). However, the additional requirements of the
direct evidence test would not alter the analysis of this Note because definitions of the "direct
evidence" standard include proof that employers asked sex-stereotyped questions during the interview. See, e.g., Brodin, supra note 32, at 305 n.6; Radford, supra note 1, at 519. See generally
Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1183-86 (2d Cir.) (useful discussion of the definition of "direct evidence" in the context of Title VII and the New York Human Rights Law), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 82 (1992); Robert S. Whitman, Note, Clearing the Mixed-Motives Smokescreen: An Approach to Disparate Treatment Under Title VIL 87 M1:H. L. REv. 863 (1989) (arguing that mixed motives claims are a convenient way for courts to classify cases in which a
plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination).
95. See supra note 94 (listing the Eighth and Ninth Circuit cases whose analytical approach
Congress endorsed in reports accompanying the Act). Using this analytical approach to examine
mixed motives claims, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits did not require a plaintiff to demonstrate an
explicit causal connection between discrimination during the hiring process and the final hiring
decision. See, e.g., Fadhl v. City and County of S~ Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir.
1984) (noting that "where employment discrimination affects ... the evaluative process," a court
may find that "sex was a significant factor in the [employment] decision" and impose Title VII
liability upon an employer); King, 738 F.2d at 257 (observing that the success of the plaintiff's
claim hinged upon allegations that the hiring process, not the hiring decision, was discriminatory); cf. Radford, supra note 1, at 516 n.200 (arguing that, in previous circuit cases concerning
mixed motives claims based on sex stereotyping, "there seemed to be little question as to whether
a link existed between the remarks and the employment decision").
96. See supra section 11.B.
97. As noted previously, a Title VII violation has occurred under section 107 when an unlawful bias was "a motivating factor for any employment practice." Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107,
105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (1991).
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concludes that Congress intended the motivating factor test to require
plaintiffs to demonstrate only a minimal causal connection between
discrimination during the hiring process and the employment decision.
Subsection II.C.2 applies the motivating factor test to claims based on
sex-stereotyped interview questions and concludes that such inquiries
constitute intentional discrimination under Title VII.
1. Definition of the Motivating Factor Standard
The reports accompanying the Civil Rights Act of 1991 defined the
section 107 test to require a plaintiff to show a "nexus between the
conduct or statements and the employment decision at issue."9 8 To
illustrate this requirement, Congress noted that comments by individuals uninvolved in the hiring process do not meet the motivating factor test because no causal connection exists between the remarks and
the hiring decision. 99 Congress did not elaborate upon its definition of
the nexus requirement, however, nor did it provide any other examples
of discrimination which would fall below the motivating factor threshold. While decisions prior to Price Waterhouse helped illustrate the
structure of section 107, they provide little assistance in defining the
motivating factor standard. HJO In addition, because the circuit courts
98. See, e.g., H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 856, supra note 81, at 18-19.
99. H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 28, pt. 2, at 18, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 711; id.
pt. 1, at 48, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 586; H.R. REP. No. 644, supra note 28, pt. 2, at
26; id. pt. 1, at 65; H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 856, supra note 81, at 18.
100. Because the 1991 House Report states that Congress intended section 107 to restore the
analytical framework "applied by the majority of the circuits prior to the Price Waterhouse decision," H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 28, pt. 2, at 18, one might argue that the legislative history
of section 107 requires courts to use pre-Price Waterhouse decisions to define the motivating
factor standard. Courts should avoid placing undue emphasis upon this statement, however.
First, the report referred to the majority of circuit cases to emphasize Congress' intention that
"any discrimination that is actually shown to play a role in a contested employment decision may
be the subject of liability" under section 107. Id. Before Price Waterhouse, three circuits held
that a plaintiff could only prove Title VII liability by demonstrating that discrimination was a
"but for" cause of the decision not to hire the plaintiff. The majority of circuits imposed liability
upon the defendant once the plaintiff demonstrated that illegitimate motives influenced the hiring
decision. Some of those courts allowed the defendant an affirmative defense for the violation if
the defendant could prove that the employer would have made the same hiring decision even if it
had not considered the plaintiff's race, sex, or national origin. Other courts only allowed the
defendant to limit the plaintiff's remedy by making such a showing. For discussion of these
cases, see supra note 43. The cases explicitly endorsed in the report support the conclusion that
Congress referred to previous case law to illustrate the burden-shifting framework of section 107
rather than to explain the nuances of the motivating factor standard. All of the cases cited in the
report shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant once the plaintiff proved that discrimination had influenced the hiring decision; none used the motivating factor test. Thus, it is likely
that the report referred to the majority of the circuits only to illustrate the proper method of
allocating the burden of proof and granting relief under section 107.
Second, in order to clarify that section 107 did not impose liability for discriminatory
thoughts, see infra note 111, the House amended its version of section 107 to propose the "contributing factor'' test as the appropriate standard for mixed motives analysis. Despite this difference in language, the reports accompanying both versions of the provision contained virtually
identical descriptions of the provision, including Congress' instruction to rely upon the decisions
prior to Price Waterhouse. Compare H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 28, pt. 1, at 18 reprinted in
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did not consistently apply the same causal standards to mixed motives
cases prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 101 it would
be extremely difficult to garner a consistent definition of the motivating factor test from existing case law. 10 2
Congress' failure to provide examples of discriminatory actions
that would not satisfy the motivating factor requirement stems, in
part, from the low threshold of the standard itself. Congressional debates concerning the requirements of the motivating factor test reveal
a consensus among supporters and opponents of the legislation that its
threshold was extremely low. In defining the causation requirements
of section 107, both the House and Senate reports, 103 as well as the
many supporters of the bill, 104 repeatedly emphasized that any reliance
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 711 (contributing.factor standard) with H.R. REP. No. 644, supra note 28,
pt. l, at 29, 65 (motivating factor standard); see also infra note 111 (noting that the contributing
factor and motivating factor standards are identical). Because Congress instructed courts to
examine past case law when proposing both the "contributing factor" and the "motivating factor" standards for section 107, one can infer that the analytical framework used by these courts,
rather than the explicit language of the test, was the focus of Congress' explanation.
101. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 238 n.2 (plurality opinion) (noting that the law concerning this issue "left the Circuits in disarray"); Radford, supra note 1, at 523 (observing that the
courts have "created standards of causation ranging from the impermissible factor playing 'any'
part in an employment decision, to the factor playing a 'discernible' or 'motivating' part, to the
factor playing a 'substantial' part, and finally to requiring the factor to play the determinative
part in the decision"). Reliance upon these decisions to define the causal requirement of section
107 would be problematic because no clear majority emerges among the courts in analyzing the
connection that must exist between the discriminatory hiring process and the hiring decision
under Title VII. See, e.g., Berl v. County of Westchester, 849 F.2d 712, 714 (2d Cir. 1988)
(requiring discrimination to be a "substantial part" of the decision); Spears v. Board of Educ.,
843 F.2d 882, 883 (6th Cir. 1988) (using the "motivating factor" standard); McQuillen v. Wisconsin Educ. Assn. Council, 830 F.2d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1987) (requiring "but for" causation),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 914 (1988); Peters v. City of Shreveport, 818 F.2d 1148, 1161 (5th Cir.
1987) (requiring "but for" causation for Equal Pay Act claim), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 930
(1988); Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 937 (1st Cir. 1987) (using the "motivating factor"
test), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 976 (1993); Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1324 (8th Cir. 1985) (en
bane) (using the "discernible factor'' test); Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175,
179 (3d Cir. 1985) (requiring "but for" causation), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1035 (1986); Ross v.
Communications Satellite Corp, 759 F.2d 355, 366 (4th Cir. 1985) (requiring "but for" causation); Fadhl v. City & County of San Francisco, 741F.2d1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1984) (using the
"significant factor" test), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 1034 (1985); Cuddy v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853, 857
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (using the "determining factor'' standard for an age discrimination case); Lee v.
Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 774 (11th Cir. 1982) (using the "motivating factor"
test).
102. See Paul J. Gude!, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation ofAction and the Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEXAS L. REV. 17, 69 (1991) (arguing that
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 "will incorporate into Title VII a concept, 'motivating factor,'
which has not been given ... any meaningful content [by the courts]").
103. H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 28, pt. 2, at 2, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 695; id.
pt. 1, at 47-48, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 586; H.R. REP. No. 644, supra note 28, pt. 2,
at 10; id. pt. 1, at 64-65; S. REP. No. 315, supra note 28, at 6-7.
104. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. H6774 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Traficant)
("If the Price Waterhouse decision is not overturned, then we send the message that there is
nothing wrong with a little overt racism or sexism .•.. We must reaffirm the principle that title
VII tolerates no discrimination."); id. at H6782 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Collins) (the bill "makes it clear that intentional discrimination is never acceptable, whether as a
primary factor or otherwise"); 137 CONG. REc. S15,464 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of
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on discrimination by an employer would constitute a Title VII violation. Senator Kennedy, a key sponsor of the bill, noted that the intention of the Act was to "tell[ ] employers and employees that in this
Nation, a little discrimination is not OK." 105 Both the Senate and the
House rejected amendments that would have strengthened the standard by requiring a showing that discrimination was a "major contributing factor" for the hiring decision. 106 Two House Reports suggested
that sex stereotyping in itself is sufficient to prove gender discrimination under the motivating factor standard without any reference to the
phase of the hiring process in which such stereotyping takes place.1o7
Thus, supporters of the bill clearly intended section 107 to establish a
relaxed threshold for proving intentional discrimination.
In attacking the section 107 framework, the opponents of the bill
also emphasized that the causal requirement was minimal. 108 The Minority View of the House Report stated that the standard "makes it
exceedingly easy for the plaintiff to be a prevailing party . . . . "1o9
Some opponents attacked the bill as a "thought control" bill that
would punish employers for the discriminatory thoughts of their employees, even when those thoughts did not affect the hiring decision. 110
The debate concerning "thought control" prompted Congress to clarify its intention that section 107 was not to be interpreted to find a
Title VII violation for coworkers' stray remarks; this opposition, however, did not lead Congress to impose more stringent proof requirements upon plaintiffs seeking to establish a mixed motives claim.1 11
Sen. Dodd) (the bill "overturns the Price Waterhouse decision thus making any reliance on prejudice illegal"); id. at H3948 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) (statement of Rep. Cardin) ("The civil rights
bill specifies that it is illegal for intentional discrimination to be any factor in the employment
process.").
105. 136 CONG. REC. S9321 (daily ed. July 10, 1990).
106. See id. at S9838-39 (daily ed. July 17, 1990) (text of the Kassebaum Amendment, which
expired on the floor without a vote); id. at H6784-85 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990) (rejecting the
LaFalce-Michel-Goodling substitute). But see id. at Sl5,366 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (statement
of Sen. Jeffords) (arguing that there is little difference between the terms "major contributing
factor" and "motivating factor'').
107. H.R. REP. No. 644, supra note 28, pt. 1, at 29 n.17; H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 28,
pt. 1, at 45 n.39, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 583 n.39 (both noting that the proposed
legislation does not affect the Supreme Court's holding in Price Waterhouse that "evidence of sex
stereotyping is sufficient to prove gender discrimination").
108. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 644, supra note 28, pt. 1, at 111, 124 (minority view).
109. Id. at 124 (1990).
110. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. S9939 (daily ed. July 18, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
(terming section 107 "a 'thought control bill' that punishes people on the basis of what they
think, even if what they do is completely legal"); id. at S9964 (daily ed. July 10, 1990) (statement
of Sen. Grassley) (arguing that under the bill "[a]n employer would be liable for the mere 'bad
thoughts' of his ... employees without any proof that these thoughts had anything to do with
discrimination"); S. REP. No. 315, supra note 28, at 99 (minority view).
111. H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 28, pt. 2, at 18, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 711; Id.
pt. 1, at 48, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 586; H.R. REP. No. 644, supra note 28, pt. 2, at
26; id. pt. 1, at 65 (clarifying that stray remarks were not actionable under section 107); see also
136 CONG. REC. 89349, S9353 (daily ed. July 10, 1990) (testimony of William T. Coleman before
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Thus, a consistent definition of the motivating factor standard emerges
among supporters and opponents of section 107. Both the floor debates and the reports accompanying the Act indicate that Congress
interpreted section 107 to require plaintiffs to demonstrate only a minimal causal connection between the discrimination that occurs during
a phase in the hiring process and the employment decision in order to
prove a Title VII violation.
2. Application of the Motivating Factor Test
Analysis of claims based on sex-stereotyped interview questions
under the motivating factor test reveals that the causal connection between discriminatory interview questions and an adverse hiring decision justifies finding that such "inquiries are actionable under Title VII.
Unlike random remarks at the office, sex-stereotyped interview questions - and the applicant's subsequent responses - clearly serve as a
basis for an employer to evaluate a candidate. 112 Employers use sexstereotyped interview questions to obtain information that they may
not legally consider in making hiring decisions. 113 Thus, there is a
clear "nexus between the conduct ... and the employment decision at
issue." 114 Sex-stereotyped interview questions also may harm even
those women whose answers do not seem to affect the employer's evaluations; 115 such inquiries reinforce negative stereotypes about women
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources) ("In no event will an employer be subject to
a monetary award merely because it entertained evil, discriminatory thoughts, without ever having acted on those motives.").
Initially, the House adopted the "contributing factor'' standard to make it clear that discriminatory thoughts did not violate section 107. H.R. REP. No. 644, supra note 28, pt. 2, at 26.
However, the House intended this language only to clarify the scope of the section 107 causal
standard rather than to impose a stricter standard of proof upon the plaintiff. First, the descriptions of both proposals were identical. Compare H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 28, pt. 2, at 18,
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 711 with H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 856, supra note 81, at 18 (both
noting that the contributing factor and motivating factor standards require "the plaintiff [to]
show[] a nexus between the conduct or statements and the employment decision at issue"); see
also supra note 100. Second, the 1990 House Report emphasized that the change was only intended to clarify the language of section 107. H.R. REP. No. 644, supra note 28, pt. 2, at 26
(observing that the change "further clarifies the intent of this legislation to prohibit only an
employer's actual discriminatory actions, rather than mere discriminatory thoughts") (emphasis
added). Finally, when the House changed the language back to the "motivating factor'' standard
to conform with the Senate's version of the Act, the only House members who co=ented upon
the change noted that it was a cosmetic one. 137 CoNG. REc. H3945 (daily ed. June 5, 1991)
(statement of Rep. Stenholm) ("This change is cosmetic and will not materially change the
courts' findings."); see also id. at H3933 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) (statement of Rep. Goodling)
(noting that "this change merely goes back to last Congress'[] H.R. 4000 as introduced").
112. Sullivan, supra note 51, at 1152.
113. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
114. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 856, supra note 81, at 18-19 (defining the motivating factor
standard).
115. Bruno v. City of Crown Point, Ind., 950 F.2d 355, 365 (1991) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (finding that despite evidence that an employer was satisfied with plaintiff's responses to sexstereotyped interview questions, discrimination had tainted the hiring decision), cen. denied, 112
s. Ct. 2998 (1992).
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in the work force. 116 Because hiring decisions inevitably involve a
comparison of candidates, 117 distinctions based on gender during the
interview process prevent a woman from competing fairly for a position.118 Sex-stereotyped questions focus the employer's attention upon
the limitations stereotypically associated with the applicant's gender
instead of upon her achievements or qualifications. 11 9 Given the employer's limited knowledge of the applicant, sex stereotyping will
likely taint the interviewer's evaluation of the candidate. 120 The close
connection between a discriminatory interview and the hiring decision
reveals that sex-stereotyped inquiries satisfy the requirements of the
motivating factor test and constitute intentional discrimination under
section 107.
Congress also may have contemplated the harm arising from sexstereotyped interview questions. Explicit statements in the House and
Senate reports suggest that Congress intended section 107 to hold an
employer liable under Title VII for subjecting an applicant to such
inquiries. Congress cited King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., which
held that sex-stereotyped interview questions violated Title VII, as an
example of the proper analysis of mixed motives claims. 121 In addition, two House reports stated that sex stereotyping constitutes intentional discrimination, though both failed to specify when or in what
form the sex stereotyping must occur. 122 These statements demonstrate Congress' awareness and approval of the conclusion that the
section 107 framework allows courts to find an employer has violated
Title VII if it poses sex-stereotyped questions to an applicant during a
job interview. Indeed, the legislative history of the Act implies that a
116. Taub, supra note 8, at 357-58 (discussing studies which demonstrate that references that
heightel} the employer's awareness of the worker's gender will interfere with an evaluation of the
employee); see supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text; cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 257 (1989) (plurality opinion) (finding it is irrelevant whether sex-stereotyped comments during an evaluation process were made in support of a candidate because any stereotyped
comment "may influence the decisionmaker to think less highly of the candidate").
117. Barbano v. Madison County, 922 F.2d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 1990).
118. See, e.g., Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1321-22 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane); Fahl v. City
of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1984); cf. King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
738 F.2d 255, 258-59 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting that employers may not maintain different interview policies for men and women); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen
Suits, "Injuries," and Article Ill 91 Mice. L. REv. 163, 203-04 (1992) (discussing injury as a
loss of opportunity to compete on equal terms).
119. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 75; see also supra notes 63 -67 and accompanying text (describing King).
122. H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 28, pt. I, at 45 n.39, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 583
n.39; H.R. REP. No. 644, supra note 28, pt. I, at 29 n.17 (both noting that the proposed legislation does not affect the Supreme Court's holding in Price Waterhouse that "evidence of sex stereotyping is sufficient to prove gender discrimination"). Even though the statute was intended to
overturn Price Waterhouse, its language does not explicitly outlaw sex stereotyping. Instead, it
uses more general terms to ban discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991).
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court that holds otherwise ignores Congress' clearly articulated intention that any reliance on discrimination violates section 107 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.123
Ill.

PROPOSED FRAMEWORK

Cases arising under the 1991 amendments to Title VII will provide
the federal courts with an opportunity to adopt a consistent approach
to adjudication of intentional discrimination claims based on sex-stereotyped interview questions. This Part proposes a framework for analyzing such claims. Section III.A describes the framework and argues
that it both meets the requirements of section 107 and addresses
broader concerns of judicial fairness. Section III.B demonstrates that
the framework promotes the policies behind Title VII as amended by
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 by deterring employment discrimination.
Section III.C anticipates and responds to criticisms of the proposal.
This section argues that the framework avoids punishing employers
for the "bad thoughts" of their employees, does not unduly burden
employers, and appropriately balances the potential costs of litigating
section 107 claims against the benefits derived from deterring employment discrimination. This Part concludes that if a plaintiff proves that
an employer posed sex-stereotyped questions during a job interview,
the court should find a Title VII violation under section 107 unless the
defendant introduces objective evidence that the interviewer posed the
same questions to men and women and that the sex stereotyping did
not affect the hiring decision.
A. Meeting the Requirements of Section 107

Under the proposed framework, when a plaintiff demonstrates that
an employer has asked questions based on sex stereotypes during an
interview, a strong presumption arises that the employer has violated
section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The employer may rebut
the inference of discrimination by providing objective evidence124 that
123. H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 28, pt. 2, at 2 reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 695; id.
pt. 1, at 47-48 reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 585-86; H.R. REP. No. 644, supra note 28, pt.
2, at 10 (1990); id. pt. 1, at 64-65; S. REP. No. 315, supra note 28, at 6-7; see, e.g., 136 CONG.
REc. H6774 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Traficant) ("If the Price Waterhouse
decision is not overturned, then we send the message that there is nothing wrong with a little
overt racism or sexism .•.. We must reaffirm the principle that title VII tolerates no discrimination."); id. at H6782 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Collins) ("[The bill] makes it
clear that intentional discrimination is never acceptable, whether as a primary factor or otherwise."); 137 CoNG. REc. S15,464 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dodd) ("[The bill]
overturns the Price Waterhouse decision, thus making any reliance on prejudice illegal."); id. at
H3948 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) (statement of Rep. Cardin) ("The civil rights bill specifies that it is
illegal for intentional discrimination to be any factor in the employment process.'').
124. See The Supreme Court - Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REv. 137, 350 (1989) [hereinafter The Supreme Court - Leading Cases] (arguing that "[i]f an employer can escape liability
by pointing generally to perceived problems with an employee's interpersonal skills, subtle but
pervasive forms of discrimination will remain unchecked"). In order to present such objective
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it posed these questions to both men and women 125 and that the final
decisionmaker deliberately disregarded any evaluations tainted by sex
stereotyping. 126 The employer must meet both parts of this test in
order to avoid a finding of liability under Title VII. Merely requiring
the defendant to prove that the interviewer asked men and women the
same questions may not prevent sex stereotyping from tainting the hiring decision; posing the same questions to male and female applicants
can be a mere formality unless it is clearly related to the position in
question. 127 In addition, studies suggest that sex stereotyping affects
women more than men. 128 Conversely, failing to require a defendant
to demonstrate that it did not rely upon sex-stereotyped comments in
making a hiring decision would allow an employer to continue treating
men and women differently during the interview process, thus deterring women applicants from applying for positions and reinforcing inequality in the workplace.129
If the employer cannot meet this two-prong test, the court should
find that gender bias was a motivating factor for the hiring decision
evidence, an employer may not merely assert that it did not discriminate against the plaintiff.
For example, the court may require an employer to produce testimony from male candidates that
the interviewer posed similar questions to them or to produce documents indicating that the
employer formally disregarded a tainted evaluation (perhaps by interviewing the candidate again
or by eliminating the original interviewer's comments from the candidate's evaluations).
125. The Supreme Court in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
335 n.15 (1977), noted that discriminatory intent sometimes may be inferred solely from significant differences in the treatment of employees. While it is unlikely that posing different questions
to men and women is sufficiently egregious to establish a Title VII violation under Teamsters, it
is appropriate to require the defendant to explain differences in the treatment of men and women
once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination under section 107. See King
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255, 257-59 (8th Cir. 1984); cf. McKinney v. Dole, 765
F.2d 1129, 1138-39 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (observing that many courts have held that any differential
treatment in "conditions of employment" on account of sex violates Title VII).
Arguably, one could bring a disparate impact claim against an employer for posing sex-stereotyped interview questions to both men and women if this sex stereotyping had a greater effect
upon tile hiring rate for female candidates. However, under this Note's two-prong test for adjudicating claims based on sex-stereotyped interview questions, an employer who poses similar
questions to men and women and deliberately disregards evaluations tainted by sex stereotyping
could not be held liable under a disparate impact theory because the sex stereotyping could not
have influenced the employer's hiring decisions.
126. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion); Barbano v.
Madison County, 922 F.2d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 1990). But see Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 294
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[o]ur cases do not support the suggestion that failure to
'disclaim reliance' on stereotypical comments itself violates Title VII").
127. Cf. Taub, supra note 8, at 367 (noting that a legal analysis that insists on symmetry is
unlikely to recognize the detrimental effects of harassment on women in particular).
128. Id. at 357-59 (noting that studies demonstrate that references that heighten the employer's awareness of the worker's gender will interfere with an evaluation of the employee); see
also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
129. Cf. Stonefield, supra note 32, at 150 (arguing that treating minority applicants badly
during the interview process will discourage them from applying for jobs); see also supra notes
117-19 and accompanying text (discussing the detrimental effects of posing sex-stereotyped interview questions solely to women applicants).
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and hold the employer liable for intentional discrimination. 130 The
court also may award the plaintiff attorney's fees under section 107. 131
The defendant, however, may limit the plaintiff's other remedies, including back pay and reinstatement, by proving that the employer
would not have selected the plaintiff had it used a nondiscriminatory
hiring process. 132
This analytical framework meets the requirements imposed by the
framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The proposal holds an employer liable for conducting a discriminatory interview that harms a
plaintiff's opportunity to compete fairly for a position, as required by
the language and legislative history of the Act. 133 In doing so, this
framework also preserves the integrity of the motivating factor test. 134
Because an employer may rebut the inference of discrimination which
arises from sex stereotyping during the interview, this Note's framework imposes liability only when a nexus exists between the discriminatory interview questions and the hiring decision.13s
In addition, the proposal addresses the requirements of judicial
fairness. The framework enables victims of discrimination to vindicate
their claims in court136 without imposing unduly burdensome proof
requirements upon them. Due to the difficulties involved in providing
direct proof of a causal connection between sex stereotyping during
the hiring process and a discriminatory hiring decision, 137 requiring a
plaintiff to provide further proof of this causal connection would discourage the pursuit of worthy claims. 138 Once a plaintiff has established that the defendant posed sex-stereotyped questions during the
interview, this framework requires the defendant to rebut the plaintiff's claim because the employer has the best access to information
that would contradict the plaintiff's assertions. 139 Further, adopting
130. Under section 107, once a plaintiff proves that gender was a motivating factor for the
hiring decision, the court must find that the employer violated Title VII. Pub. L. No. 102-166, §
107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (1991). But see Bach, supra note 19, at 1275-81 (proposing a different framework for analyzing claims based on sex-stereotyped interview questions that uses direct
evidence analysis and does not rely on the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
131. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (1991).
132. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (1991).
133. See supra section 11.B.
134. See supra section 11.C. (describing the motivating factor standard).
135. See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 856, supra note 81, at 18.
136. Cf Stonefield, supra note 32, at 169 (arguing that "[r]equiring people to endure ...
workplace indignities without redress undermines the intrinsic purposes of the laws").
137. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 272-73 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
138. See 490 U.S. at 272-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); The Supreme Court
- Leading Cases, supra note 124, at 349; cf Taub, supra note 8, at 393 (noting that it is difficult
to prove that a hiring practice is not neutral).
139. See 490 U.S. at 273 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). But see 490 U.S. at 292
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the liberal rules of discovery should discourage courts
from placing this burden on the defendant).
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this well-accepted method of allocating the burdens of proof1 40 does
not unfairly encumber the employer. As Justice O'Connor observed in
Price Waterhouse, an employer should bear the risk at trial when the
employer's own actions during the hiring process have made it difficult
to determine whether discrimination tainted the hiring decision. 141
B. Furthering the Policies Behind Title VII as Amended by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991
By deterring sex discrimination, the proposed framework fulfills
the goals of Title VII as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 142
Because this framework allows plaintiffs in mixed motives cases to recover attorney's fees, it encourages women to act as "private attorney
general[s]" 143 on behalf of the government to fight sex stereotyping in
employment. This threat of increased litigation provides an incentive
for employers to eliminate sex stereotyping during the hiring process
and to train employees to avoid it when conducting job interviews. 144
Increased training, in turn, will raise employees' consciousness of the
problems created by sex stereotyping145 and therefore help decrease
sex discrimination in the workplace. t46
By allowing employers to avoid liability if they can present objective evidence that the discrimination during the interview did not taint
the hiring decision, the proposal creates a strong incentive for employ140. See 490 U.S. at 273 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
141. 409 U.S. at 272-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see a/so NLRB v. Transportation Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983) ("when ••• [t]he employer ••• has acted out of
a motive that is declared illegitimate by the statute •.• [i]t is fair that he bear the risk that the
influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated ••••").
142. See Brodin, supra note 32, at 317 (arguing that one of the primary goals of Title VII is
"the elimination of discrimination in employment opportunities"); Radford, supra note 1, at 504
(sex stereotypes "have both an internal and an external effect on the achievement and promotion
of women"); Taub, supra note 8, at 349 (stating that sex stereotyping "constitute[s] a primary
obstacle to equal opportunity" for women); Weber, supra note 2, at 534 (noting the "deterrent
orientation" of Title VII). Congress was especially concerned with extending the protections of
Title VII to women, as exemplified by the original title of the Civil Rights Act of 1991: The Civil
Rights And Women's Equity in Employment Act of 1991. H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 28, pt.
1, at 1.
143. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1967) (per curiam).
144. See Taub, supra note 8, at 360, 417; Schott, supra note 2, at 185-86; The Supreme Court
- Leading Cases, supra note 124, at 349, 350.
145. See Taub, supra note 8, at 360-61, 417; The Supreme Court - Leading Cases, supra
note 124, at 350.
146. See Taub, supra note 8, at 360-61; The Supreme Court - Leading Cases, supra note
124, at 350. As in other Title VII cases, even if employers try to subvert the law by concealing
discriminatory animus in neutral questions, the law's explicit disapproval of such action may
nevertheless help discourage employment discrimination. Taub, supra note 8, at 417 (concluding
that if employers just conceal their discriminatory animus, there is "still something to be gained"
by outlawing discriminatory conduct). But see Judith O. Brown et al., The Failure of Gender
Equality: An Essay in Constitutional Dissonance, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 573, 590-618 (1987) (arguing
that neutral, formalistic application of the laws ignores the social context of sex discrimination
and is inadequate to promote equality).

June 1993]

Note -

Sex-Stereotyped Interview Questions

1851

ers to monitor the hiring process closely and to maintain adequate
records. 147 Increased monitoring of each stage of the hiring process
will lead employers to "weed out" interviewers who are likely to discriminate148 and to reward employees who conduct fair, nondiscriminatory interviews. A clear commitment by an employer to preventing
sex stereotyping from influencing hiring policies ultimately will ensure
fairer access to job opportunities for future applicants. 149
C. A Consideration of Criticisms of Section 107
In addition to effectuating the intent of Congress in passing the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, the proposed framework also addresses preenactment criticisms of section 107 and balances those concerns
against the benefits derived from deterring sex stereotyping. Critics
asserted that section 107 would create too low a threshold for proving
mixed motives claims and therefore punish employers for the bad
thoughts of their employees. 150 By allowing an employer to rebut the
inference of discrimination arising from sex-stereotyped interview
questions, however, the proposal protects an employer who has taken
steps to prevent discrimination from tainting the hiring process.1 51
Thus, this approach only holds defendants liable under section 107
when sex-stereotyped interview questions have actually harmed a
plaintiff's chances to compete fairly for a position. Still, the framework provides this protection without unduly weakening the effects of
section 107152 or contradicting the clearly articulated intentions of
Congress to impose liability when an employer places any reliance
upon discriminatory animus.153
Prior to passage of the Act, critics also asserted that section 107
would impose burdensome costs upon employers to educate their employees154 and to pay attorney's fees to plaintiffs who prove a violation
147. See Taub, supra note 8, at 360-61, 394; Schott, supra note 2, at 185-86; The Supreme
Court - Leading Cases, supra note 124, at 350.
148. See Schott, supra note 2, at 185-86; cf. Taub, supra note 8, at 360-61 (supporting internal methods for employers to identify and, if necessary, correct attitudinal biases of employees).
149. See supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
150. "Bad thoughts" are those discriminatory biases which have not influenced the hiring
decision. See, e.g., Irving M. Geslewitz, Understanding the 1991 Civil Rights Act, PRAC. LAW.
Mar. 1992, at 57, 65-66.
151. In doing so, this framework effectuates the interpretation of Title VII offered by the
minority view in the 1990 House Report accompanying passage of the Act: "[T]he goal of Title
VII should be to 'lead employers to establish an employment process with an effective system of
checks and balances that prevents decisions from being made for illegal reasons.' " H.R. REP.
No. 644, supra note 28, pt. 1, at 124 (minority view) (citation omitted).
152. Cf. Taub, supra note 8, at 378 (arguing that courts should hold employers responsible
for the actions of their employees in order to eradicate discrimination in the workplace).
153. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
154. Cf. S. REP. No. 315, supra note 28, at 99 (minority view) (noting that it will be difficult
for employers to control the thoughts of their employees).
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of section 107. 155 These assertions, however, overestimate the costs
imposed by section 107. First, educating employees about sex-stereotyped interview questions imposes only a marginal cost upon employers; most employers covered by Title VII already have developed
training programs for employees involved in hiring decisions due to
developments in other areas of Title VII litigation. 156 The proposed
framework would therefore require only a minimal additional investment by employers to train employees effectively. As a result, the benefits society derives from fairer treatment of job applicants and an
increased awareness of the dangers of sex stereotyping157 may be
achieved at a relatively low cost to the employer.15s
Second, when balanced against the harms created by sex stereotyping, payment of attorney's fees represents a modest burden 159 to place
upon an employer who has discriminated against a job applicant during the hiring process. By allowing, and thus sanctioning, sex stereotyping during a job interview, employers limit the advancement of
women in the workplace. 160 The award serves both as a punishment
for employers and as an incentive for plaintiffs to pursue worthy
claims against employers who have allowed sex stereotyping to taint
the hiring process. 161 Aggressive pursuit of these claims, in turn, deters such discrimination and enables future applicants to compete
fairly for job opportunities. 162
The proposal provides a flexible framework which promotes equality in employment without unduly burdening employers. The framework only holds employers liable for discrimination when sexstereotyped interview questions preclude a plaintiff from competing
fairly for a job opportunity. The proposal properly allocates the burdens of proof among the parties. It balances the costs the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 imposes upon employers against the societal benefits arising from the pursuit of worthy discrimination claims. Finally, the
proposed framework creates important incentives for employers to
monitor the hiring process and thus to ensure equality of opportunity
for women in the workplace.
155. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REc. S9330 (daily ed. July 10, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
("[Section 107 is] a litigation bonanza . . . . Wait until you see what employment practice is
going to cost us. [It] is the most ridiculous section I have seen yet.").
156. See Stonefield, supra note 32, at 150.
157. See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
158. See Taub, supra note 8, at 379 n.159.
159. See Schott, supra note 2, at 184.
160. See supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
161. See Brodin, supra note 32, at 324 n.130 (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266
(1978)).
162. See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides an opportunity for federal
courts to adopt a consistent approach to analyzing Title VII claims
based on sex-stereotyped interview questions. Before passage of the
Act, courts adjudicated such claims in an inconsistent manner. Some
courts recognized a connection between sex-stereotyped interview
questions and a biased hiring decision; other courts, when presented
with evidence that an employer posed such questions during an interview, required plaintiffs to produce independent evidence that the hiring decision was discriminatory: The disagreement among the circuits
hinged upon whether the court assumed that discrimination during
the interview phase of the hiring process necessarily tainted the employment decision.
The 1991 amendments to Title VII clarify the proper approach to
mixed motives analysis and help resolve the division within the federal
courts. An examination of the language, structure, and legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 reveals that discrimination during
a phase in the hiring process is actionable under Title VII whenever
that discrimination bears a minimal causal connection to the hiring
decision. Because a causal nexus exists between sex-stereotyped interview questions and the hiring decision, courts should find a Title VII
violation whenever an employer poses such questions. The employer
may avoid liability only by demonstrating that the interviewer posed
similar questions to male applicants and that the final decisionmaker
deliberately disregarded any evaluations tainted by sex stereotyping.
By adjudicating claims based on sex-stereotyped interview questions in
this manner, a court will effect the intent of Congress, address the
requirements of judicial fairness, and discourage employment
discrimination.

